

Korea's Vision for Unification and the Future of East Asia

Monday, June 9 Westin Chosun Hotel, Seoul
MOFA-EAI International Conference



외교부
Ministry of Foreign Affairs



앞 표지

Korea's Vision for Unification and the Future of East Asia

Monday, June 9, 10:00 AM – 3:10 PM
Westin Chosun Hotel, Orchid Room

Hosted by

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
East Asia Institute

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Welcoming Messages

Twenty five years have passed since the Berlin Wall came down. The unification of Germany, which took shape at the west side of the Eurasian continent, signaled not only a new Germany, but also the new post-Cold War era that served to steer the integration of Europe that is evident today. On the east side of the Eurasian continent, however, conflicts and antagonism have deepened despite greater economic interdependence and some would even describe this as the "return of geopolitics." Indeed, uncertainties with regard to the situation on the Korean Peninsula are intensifying and the East Asian security environment, let it be land, air, or space, is facing its utmost severity since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the ongoing recent events in the middle of the Eurasian continent are affecting the security situation in East Asia as a whole.

As conflicts and antagonism prevail, the heartfelt longing for peace and cooperation grows all the stronger. In this regard, the Park Geun-hye administration has been announcing a series of major policies in stages under the vision of "a new Korean Peninsula, a new Northeast Asia, and a better world," even before the launch of the new government. And recently, President Park has personally presented the "Dresden Initiative" with regard to the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. As we are faced by near seventy years since the division of the Korean Peninsula, this serves as a clear statement of our vision and will to ensure that our unification policy will contribute to the realization of happiness—not only throughout the Korean Peninsula, but also in East Asia and the global community, in a way that is similar to how the united Germany contributed to a more cooperative regional and world order.

The month of June always reminds us of the painful memory of the Korean War, and brings us together to contemplate on what future path should be taken by the Korean Peninsula. We are also aware that the journey toward unification is no easy path. And this is why we are inviting scholars from our neighboring countries such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, and from Germany, a country with a successful unification experience, to address the vision of a unified Korean Peninsula by hosting this international seminar on the unification of the Korean Peninsula and the Future of East Asia. Hoping for a Korean unification that is in harmony with the interests of our neighbors, blessed by the international community, and contributes to the benefit of humankind as a whole, I would like to express my sincere wish that this seminar succeeds in bringing together your thoughtful insights and wisdom as we aspire to reach that end.

Yun Byung-se
Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Unification of the Korean peninsula presents both opportunities and challenges for the future stability and prosperity of East Asia. Currently, North Korea's nuclear development and continuous provocations pose a direct and substantial threat to South Korea as well as to its neighboring countries. However, in East Asia, a region where conflicts and confrontations continue to intensify despite increasing economic interdependence, there is a lack of common effort to respond effectively to threats arising from North Korea. In this era of complex and transformative international relations, South Korea must prepare for the unforeseeable future and strengthen its unification diplomacy as a basis for cooperation and bringing about a common effort toward North Korea with its neighbors.

Last March, President Park Geun-hye offered a three-point proposal for North Korea in Dresden, the symbolic city of the German unification. It aimed to provide a foundation for peaceful unification by prioritizing pressing humanitarian issues, developing infrastructure for co-prosperity, and regaining harmony between the South and North Korean people. As much as South Korea's powerful neighbors such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia welcome such efforts, they are paying close attention to the potential role of Korean unification in restructuring a new regional order in Northeast Asia. Through its own experience, Germany's example clearly demonstrates that close dialogue with neighboring countries is crucial in shaping the post-unification environment. And this dialogue is crucial in devising a medium to long-term strategy that encourages North Korea to change and follow a path toward peaceful unification.

With this in mind, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the East Asia Institute are holding an international conference on "Korea's Vision for Unification and the Future of East Asia." I hope this conference provides a meaningful opportunity to explore the implications of Korean unification on the future of East Asia and bring greater attention toward Korea's diplomatic vision.

Lee Sook-Jong
President
East Asia Institute

Program

09:30-10:00 **Registration**

10:00-10:30 **Welcoming Remarks**

LEE Sook-Jong, East Asia Institute

Keynote Speech

YUN Byung-se, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea

10:40-12:20 **Session 1 THE DRESDEN DECLARATION AND KOREA'S VISION FOR UNIFICATION**

Moderator **SHIN Bongkil**, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Korea National Diplomatic Academy

Presenters **“Korea's Diplomatic Strategy for a Unified Korean Peninsula”**
CHUN Chaesung, East Asia Institute/Seoul National University

“Trust Policy: Mirroring of German Experiences?”
Hanns Günther HILPERT, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

Discussants **Peter BECK**, Asia Foundation
Alexander FEDOROVSKIY, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
JIN Canrong, Renmin University of China
SHEEN Seong-Ho, Seoul National University
TANAKA Hitoshi, Institute for International Strategy, Japan Research Institute (JRI)

12:20-13:30 **Luncheon**

13:30-15:05	Session 2	A UNIFIED KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE FUTURE OF EAST ASIA
	Moderator	HA Young-Sun, East Asia Institute
	Presenters	“Towards a Unified Korea: An American Perspective” Peter BECK, Asia Foundation
		“Chinese Perception: A Unified Korean Peninsula and the Future of East Asia” JIN Canrong, Renmin University of China
		“Korean Unification and the Future of East Asia: A Japanese Perspective” TANAKA Hitoshi, Institute for International Strategy, Japan Research Institute (JRI)
		“Korean Unification and Russia’s Priorities in East Asia” Alexander FEDOROVSKIY, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
	Discussants	CHUN Chaesung, East Asia Institute/Seoul National University LEE Chung Min, Yonsei University Hanns Günther HILPERT, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
15:05-15:10	Closing Remarks	HA Young-Sun, East Asia Institute

Biographies of Participants

Peter BECK

Peter M. Beck is the Korea Representative for the San Francisco-based Asia Foundation. He also serves on the Korea Foundation's Publications Board and the Korean-American Educational Commission. Previously, he was the executive director of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and opened the International Crisis Group's Northeast Asia office in Seoul. Prior to that, he was the Director of Research and Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C. (1997 – 2004). He has taught at American University, Ewha Womans University, Georgetown University, the Naval Post Graduate School, and Yonsei University. He has held fellowships at the Council on Foreign Relations, the East-West Center in Honolulu, and Stanford University. He has served as an advisor to the International Republican Institute and as a member of the Ministry of Unification's Policy Advisory Committee. He has also been a columnist for *Donga Daily*, *Joongang Sunday*, *The Korea Herald*, and *Weekly Chosun*. He has published over 100 articles, including in *Asian Survey*, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, *Foreign Policy*, *Mother Jones*, *Oxford Analytica*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *Yale Global*. He has also testified before Congress. He received his B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley, completed the Korean language program at Seoul National University, and conducted his graduate studies at U.C. San Diego's Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies.

CHUN Chaesung

Chun Chaesung is the Chair of the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at East Asia Institute. He is a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University and director of Center for International Studies at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun is also serving as an advisory committee member for the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University. His research interests include international relations, security studies, South Korean foreign policy, and East Asian security relations. His recent publications include *Is Politics Moral? Reinhold Niebuhr's Transcendental Realism* (2012), *Theory of East Asian International Relations* (2011), and "The Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countries" (2008).

Alexander FEDOROVSKIY

Alexander Fedorovskiy is an expert in the Pacific regional economy, Northeast Asian affairs, Korean economy and Russian-Korean relations. He received a Ph.D. in economics from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). He is the Head of Section for Pacific Studies at the IMEMO of the Russian Academy of Sciences since 1996. From 2003 to 2007, he served as the Executive Secretary of the Center for Contemporary Korean Studies. He also taught at the Moscow MGIMO University of the MOFA the Russian Federation and served as the member of the editorial board of the journals "KoRusForum" and "International

Journal of Korean Unification Studies.” He has held research fellowships in South Korea, Japan and the United States, and participated in research programs initiated by the Korea Institute for National Unification; SIPRI; the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA, Japan); Gorbachev-Foundation; the RAND Corporation; the Korea Foundation. Dr. Fedorovskiy is the author of 3 individual monographs, 20 co-authored monographs, and about 200 journal and newspaper articles published in Russia, South Korea, the USA, Japan and other countries. His main publications include: *National Strategy and ROK-Russian Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century* (co-eds, 2010), *Main Results and Prospects for Bilateral Cooperation* (2010), “Problems and Prospects for Regional Cooperation in East Asia” (2010), “President Medvedev’s Policy towards East Asia and the Korean Peninsula” (2009), and “Chaebol Phenomena: the State and Big-business Relations in the Republic of Korea” (2008).

HA Young-Sun

Ha Young-Sun is the Chairman of the board of trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Currently, Dr. Ha is serving as a member of President Park Geun-hye’s national security advisory group. He was the Co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era, the Director of the Center for International Studies and American Studies Institute at Seoul National University, the President of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and a research fellow at the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington. His recent books and edited volumes include: *Trustpolitik 2.0 on the Korean Peninsula: Complex Policy of Deterrence, Engagement, and Trust* (forthcoming), *Toward 2020: Ten Agendas for South Korea’s Foreign Policy* (2013), *A New Era for Korea-Japan Relations: Seven Tasks for Bilateral Cooperation* (2013), *Young-Sun Ha on International Politics: A Collection of Columns from 1991 to 2011* (2012), and *Complex World Politics: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order* (2012), *The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Coevolution for the Advancement* (2010), *The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century* (2010), and *A New Era of Complex Networks in Korea-Japan Relations* (2010).

Hanns Günther HILPERT

Hanns Günther Hilpert is the Deputy Head of the Asia Research Division at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, an independent academic research center, which advises Germany’s parliament (Bundestag) and federal government on foreign and security policy issues. Specializing on Northeast Asia, especially on its trade and economic affairs, Hanns Günther Hilpert’s latest works include: *Currency Cooperation in East Asia* (ed. 2014); “China’s Trade Policy. Dominance without the Will to Lead” (2013); “Charting a New Course on North Korea’s Nuclear Programme? The Options and the Non-Proliferation Treaty” (2013); *Fragmentation or Cooperation in Global Resource Governance? A Comparative Analysis of the Raw Materials Strategies of the G20* (2013); and “Comparison of German and Korean Division: Analogies and Differences” (2009). Formerly, he worked for the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) in Tokyo from 1999 to 2002, and the Ifo Institute for Economic Research in

Munich from 1989 to 1999. Dr. Hilpert received his Ph.D. in economics from the Free University of Berlin.

JIN Canrong

Jin Canrong is a professor and Associate Dean with the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China. He is also a visiting professor at the Gerald Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, in 2003 and 2007, and the “Weilun” Chair Professor at Tsinghua University, in 2006. His educational background includes a B.A. from Shanghai Fudan University in political science, a M.A. from the Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and a Ph.D. from the School of International Studies at Peking University. Before joining Renmin University, he worked for the Institute of American Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) from 1987 to 2002. He has travelled over 40 countries and regions. His studies focus on American politics (the U.S. Congress in particular), American foreign policy, Sino-U.S. relations and China's foreign policy. His publications include over 100 academic papers, over 600 articles for mass media, 7 books and 5 translated books including *Liberal Tradition in America* by Louis Hart, *Between Hope and History* by President Bill Clinton, and *Diplomacy* by Henry Kissinger. As the first columnist in international politics in mainland China, Dr. Jin wrote “Focusing on America” columns for *World Affairs* (half-monthly) from 1995 to 1998. He has served as Vice President of China National Association of International Studies; Vice President of the Pacific Society of China; Adviser of the policy planning office at the National People's Congress; and Standing Councilor of China Reform Forum.

LEE Chung Min

Lee Chung Min is professor of international relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, and was appointed by President Park Geun-hye as Ambassador for National Security Affairs in June 2013. Dr. Lee is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Asian Security at the IISS and the program chair of the Seoul Forum for International Affairs. From 2009 to 2010, Dr. Lee served as Ambassador for International Security Affairs and from 2009 to 2010, as a member of the President's Foreign Policy Advisory Council. Prior to joining Yonsei University in 1988, Dr. Lee held a number of research positions at key think tanks including the RAND Corporation from 1995 to 1998, the Sejong Institute from 1989 to 1994, and the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, from 1994 to 1995. He was a visiting professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy from 2005 to 2007 and GRIPS, Tokyo, from 2004 to 2005. Dr. Lee is a specialist in Asian security issues and has written extensively on East Asian defense and foreign affairs and intelligence. He received his B.A. from Yonsei University (1982) and his M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School, Tufts University (1988). He also has lived in ten countries.

LEE Sook-Jong

Lee Sook-Jong is the President of the East Asia Institute, an independent, non-profit think tank based in Seoul. She is also a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan Univer-

sity. Currently, Dr. Lee holds a number of advisory positions in the South Korean government, including the President's national security advisory group and councils for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). Dr. Lee also participates as member of the Trilateral Commission, Council of Councils, and many other transnational networks on research and policy studies. Her research interests include multilateralism, democracy, and civil societies, focusing on South Korea, Japan, and other East Asian countries. Previously, Dr. Lee was a research fellow at the Sejong Institute, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, a professorial lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, and a visiting fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Her recent publications include *Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea* (ed. 2013), "South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy" (2012), *Korea's Role in Global Governance for Development Cooperation* (ed 2012), *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia* (eds. 2011), *Japan and East Asia: Regional Cooperation and Community Building* (eds. 2011), and *Toward Managed Globalization: The Korean Experience* (eds. 2010). Dr. Lee received her B.A. from Yonsei University, and M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard University.

SHEEN Seong-ho

Sheen Seong-ho is a professor of international security and East Asia, and Associate Dean for Office of International Affairs in Seoul National University. He also works as the Managing Editor for *Journal of International and Area Studies* (JIAS) published by the Institute of International Affairs (IIA), GSIS. Professor Sheen was a visiting fellow at the East-West Center DC, a CNAPS fellow at the Brookings Institution, an assistant research professor at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Honolulu, Hawaii, and a research fellow at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Cambridge, Mass. He also taught at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. In addition, he advised various government organizations including the South Korean National Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Unification, the South Korean National Assembly. His areas of interest include international security, U.S. foreign policy, Northeast Asian politics and the Korean Peninsula. Professor Sheen received his Ph.D. and M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and his B.A. from Seoul National University. His recent publications include *The Future of Korea's Diplomacy 2020* (2013), "Northeast Asia's Aging Population and Regional Security: Demographic Peace?" (2013), *North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Peace on the Korean Peninsula* (2008).

SHIN Bongkil

Amb. Shin Bongkil is the President of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). He was the inaugural Secretary-General of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat of China, Japan, and Korea (2011-2013). Since joining the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1978, he has mainly involved in the issues related to North Korea, China and Japan as the Director of the Inter-Korea Policy Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992-1995), Counsellor/Consul General (1996-1998)

and Minister (2004-2007) in the Korean Embassy in Beijing, China, and the Special Advisor at the Office of Planning for the North Korean Light-Water Reactor Project (2002-2003). His latest posts include the Spokesperson for the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003-2004), Ambassador to Jordan (2007-2010), Ambassador for International Economic Cooperation (2010-2011), and Ambassador for Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation (2013-2014). Amb. Shin graduated from Seoul National University with a bachelor's degree in international relations, and was the editor-in-chief of the University Weekly Newspaper. He studied Chinese at Peking University in China and received his MA from the University of North Korean Studies in Korea.

TANAKA Hitoshi

Tanaka Hitoshi is the Chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd. He has also been a senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and a visiting professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, after retiring from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2005 as the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Tanaka held various posts which include Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (2001-02), and the Economic Affairs Bureau (2000-01); Consul-General in San Francisco (1998-2000); and Deputy Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau (1996-98). Mr. Tanaka holds a B.A. in law from Kyoto University, and B.A./ M.A. in PPE from Oxford University. He writes various articles both in Japanese and English including East Asia Insights (<http://www.jcie.or.jp/insights/>).

YUN Byung-se

Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se, who studied law at Seoul National University, entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea in 1977. He served as Senior Coordinator at the National Security Council, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign, Security and Unification Policy. Recently, just before the inauguration of President Park Geun-hye, Minister Yun worked as a member of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, National Defense and Unification in the 18th Presidential Transition Committee, playing a crucial role in constructing the new administration's foreign policy strategy such as the "Korean Peninsula Trust Building Process." As head of Korean foreign policy, Minister Yun endeavors to best serve Korea's diplomatic interests, based on his diverse experience of having worked in Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau, serving in Geneva, and in the United States.

* The list is in alphabetical order.

Presentation Materials

Session 1

The Dresden Declaration and Korea's Vision for Unification

Korea's Diplomatic Strategy for a Unified Korean Peninsula

Chun Chaesung

East Asia Institute/Seoul National University

I. Korea's Strategy toward Unification and Northeast Asia

- Setting the task of expanding the foundation for unification as a national agenda and emphasizing the benefits of unification by the Park Geun-hye administration is a positive development.
 - ✓ Given the reality of decreasing desire toward unification and perception change triggered by the emergence of a new generation, it is necessary to strengthen the vision toward Korean unification at both domestic and regional levels.
 - ✓ It is necessary to prepare and create a discourse that focuses on the benefits of the unification of the Korean peninsula, not to mention its significance toward the Korean people and the politics in East Asia.
 - ✓ But the effort to focus on the benefits of unification should not take away policy resources from the current North Korea policy; reality requires working on tasks such as the North Korean nuclear issue, settlement of peace on the Korean peninsula, and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation; to be pursued simultaneously with furthering unification strategy.
 - ✓ The roadmap toward unification needs to be reorganized in order to bring about a concrete unification policy.
- Questions on “what kind of unification?” or “through which process unification can be achieved?” will determine the direction of the diplomatic strategy of a unified Korean peninsula and its implications.
 - ✓ As much as the unification of the Korean peninsula is an issue for South and North Korea, it is also important for the changing regional order in Northeast Asia; seeking cooperation with neighboring countries and a more stable regional security architecture needs to go hand-in-hand with the unification process.
 - ✓ An accurate assessment of North Korea's current situation and an appropriate knowledge and vision with respect to governance issues on the Korean peninsula needs to be provided.
 - ✓ It is important to ensure the non-proliferation norm to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and policies that seek change for North Korea based on humanitarian and democratic values.

- So far, East Asia affairs have been heavily dependent upon factors such as great power politics, balance of power, and power transition. Therefore bringing about a multilateral cooperative mechanism is important during the unification process.
 - ✓ Mechanisms that enable multilateral cooperation and stable great power politics, especially U.S.-China relations, need to be actively pursued during the unification process.
 - ✓ While the U.S. and China are cooperating toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through “a new type of major country relations,” they have not yet engaged in geopolitical cooperation on the future of North Korea, nor have they agreed on the process of finding a new governance system for the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it will be important to decrease the strategic mistrust between the U.S. and China and provide opportunities for the two countries to cooperate further.
 - ✓ Diplomatic support from the U.S. and China is especially important during the pursuit of unification diplomacy. South Korea should send clear signals that it is seeking unification as a long-term but steady goal, and place emphasis on the stability in the border areas between China and the Korean peninsula and clarify the role of a unified Korean peninsula as a middle power with respect to security and diplomacy.
 - ✓ Inducing normalization of North Korea will need South Korea’s leading effort in not only inter-Korean exchange and cooperation but also creating a cooperative and supportive international system for North Korea’s development. Such efforts should also deliver the message that South Korea ultimately seeks unification.
 - ✓ While Japan seems to be strengthening its military in between the competitive relationship of the U.S. and China, its cooperation with South Korea is necessary for the process of resolving problems in the Korean peninsula and developing an East Asian strategy toward regional peace and stability.
 - ✓ Russia is in favor of the unification of the Korean peninsula as well as in multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, a shared effort toward Eurasian cooperation and bringing about multilateral security mechanisms is therefore necessary.
- Clarifying the key goals and scope of unification diplomacy is a necessary step before setting a unification strategy.
 - ✓ Explain how unification can contribute to the international community and promote the necessity of unification.
 - ✓ Strengthen international solidarity with regard to North Korea under the premise of unification so that South Korea’s North Korea policies can lead to unification
 - ✓ Develop and promote South Korea’s vision with regard to the diplomatic stances of a unified Korean peninsula.

- ✓ Secure military deterrence capacity necessary to manage the unification process in a stable manner, once unification becomes more visible.
- ✓ Secure international support for North Korea in order to smooth the integration process with North Korea.
- ✓ Secure diplomatic support for South Korea to lead the unification process, in case of a contingency or sudden change in North Korea.
- ✓ Promote normalization of North Korea in order to decrease unification costs
- ✓ Secure international support on the diplomatic strategy of a unified Korean peninsula.

II. Diplomatic Vision for a Unified Korea

- The North Korea problem, including the nuclear issue, has had the effect of keeping South Korea's strategic concerns over balance of power politics among Northeast Asian powers from emerging.
 - ✓ As geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural competition continues between the U.S. and China, competition occurs simultaneously on their surrounding strategic backgrounds.
 - ✓ East Asian countries are trying to maximize their interests while pursuing various strategies in order to solve the strategic dilemma between the U.S.-China competition.
 - ✓ Because South Korea has had to focus on resolving the North Korea problem, it was able to avoid making difficult strategic choices between the U.S. and China's strategic dilemma.
 - ✓ But South Korea's strategy will gain much more attention once unification occurs. It will be necessary for South Korea to prepare and provide how North Korea and unification policy processes connect to post-unification conditions.
- South Korea's goal with respect to East Asian strategy is to ensure systemic flexibility in the region.
 - ✓ It aims to strengthen and develop a norm structure that East Asian countries can agree to while opposing great power rivalries that harm stability and peace in the region. Also, its key approach seeks to strengthen multilateral cooperation against the backdrop of international politics that are primarily centered around great powers.
 - ✓ To achieve its regional goals, South Korea needs to establish the direction of its diplomatic strategy with regard to cooperation with great powers, cooperative middle power diplomacy, and the promotion of global norms.
 - ✓ The ultimate goal is to resolve the fundamental contradiction in East Asian international politics and to provide a long-term vision for sustainable peace.

- Korean unification will enable us to consider the notion of “normalizing the abnormal” in Northeast Asian international politics.
 - ✓ The biggest problem in Northeast Asian international politics can be found in each state’s incomplete transition toward the modern state, which resulted in greater state-to-state rivalry.
 - ✓ China and South Korea’s respective history of division as well as their efforts toward unification, Japan’s efforts toward normalization of its status that has been non-normal since the end of World War II, etc. are tangled and causing problems today. Also, such problems worsen when extra-regional powers try to exploit such abnormalities in Northeast Asia.
 - ✓ It is necessary to show how a “unified Korea,” a “unified China,” and a “normalized Japan” can mutually coexist, cooperate, and contribute to Northeast Asian multilateral cooperation.
 - ✓ The discourse on unification should set its direction towards sovereign equality, respect toward sovereignty of other countries, prevention of war, multilateral cooperation, etc., under the premise of normal coexistence of individual states

- Need to establish the notion that a strong, unified Korean peninsula can provide the foundation for alleviating the competitive nature of Northeast Asian great power politics
 - ✓ Focusing on South Korea’s current diplomatic strategy including middle power diplomacy, diplomacy of promoting cooperation among great powers, and aim toward multilateralism will be important.
 - ✓ A unified Korean peninsula should be able to strengthen South Korea’s current regional middle power diplomacy. It needs to suggest how the Korean peninsula can play a much stronger role as a buffer that can prevent great power conflicts.
 - ✓ Based on such diplomatic strategy, South Korea should provide a vision that can coordinate the future of ROK-U.S. alliance, ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, and its strategic cooperative relations with China.
 - ✓ Through such a vision, South Korea will be able to simultaneously relieve China’s concern that “a unified Korean peninsula will be pro-U.S. and anti-China” or the U.S. and Japan’s concern that “the unification of the Korean peninsula will weaken the ROK-U.S. alliance and push Korea closer to China.”

Trust Policy: Mirroring of German Experiences?

Hanns Günther Hilpert
German Institute for International and Security Affairs

I. Starting Point Dresden: Defining Reunification as the Ultimate Goal of Trust Policy

1. Emergence of Trust Policy

- A three-partite concept for the Park presidency: Vision, philosophy, policy
- Main Principles
 - ✓ Holding a firm line in security affairs
 - ✓ Insisting on keeping agreements
 - ✓ Accommodating in economic and humanitarian issues
 - ✓ Promoting bilateral dialogue
- Remaining vague in implementation:
 - ✓ Which Priorities?
 - ✓ What concrete steps and measures?
 - ✓ How to overcome mistrust?

2. The Meaning of the Dresden Declaration

- Presidential endorsement of a reunification strategy
- Transition from (Trustpolitik) concept to a more strategy-like approach
- Identification of main impediments:
 - ✓ Military confrontation
 - ✓ Mutual distrust
 - ✓ Social and cultural gaps
 - ✓ North Korea's international isolation
- Concrete suggestions for North-South-cooperation:
 - ✓ Agenda for Humanity
 - ✓ Agenda for Co-Prosperity
 - ✓ Agenda for Integration
- Symbolism of Dresden

3. Trust Policy: Open questions

- Which immediate and concrete steps can be/should be taken?

- How can trust be built up? How can North Korea's ruling elite be convinced to renounce power?
- How to combine firmness with flexibility?
- Which concessions can be offered to the North, while facing an uncompromising public in the South?
- How to reassure allies and partners? How to win their support?

II. Referential Point Germany: Analogies and Differences to the Korean Setting

1. Referential point: Differences and analogies Germany versus Korea



2. Korea and Germany: Some Striking Similarities

- Crucial geostrategic location
- Parallel genesis of division
- International Security: No unification without international consent
- Development of capitalistic versus socialistic systems
- Emergence of different mindsets, identities and mentalities

3. Korea and Germany: Crucial Differences

- Different security settings:
 - ✓ Enduring legacy of the Korean war

- ✓ End of cold war in Europe
- Different Size and income relations
- Different Depth and intensity of division
- Different regional integration:
 - ✓ Deep multilateral integration of West Germany in the region (EU, EMS) and in the transatlantic security system (NATO)
 - ✓ Bilateral security alliance ROK-USA
- Extreme Positioning of the DPRK
 - ✓ Foreign policy independence, conventional first strike capacity, nuclear outbreak
 - ✓ Totalitarianism: militarization of society, personality cult, comprehensive indoctrination of the populace
- Last not least: Korea (North and South) perceived German unification

4. Some Conclusions

- Differences rather than the analogies matter for Korea
- Korean unification to become more difficult, to be more protracted and more tension-filled
- Mutual recognition – a necessary stepping stone for mutual cooperation
- Rapprochement no substitute for unification or system transformation
- Economic cooperation – a useful means to build political trust and to alleviate living conditions
- People-to-people contact, accessible information - a necessary building block for national cohesion and solidarity
- Strong political and economical fundamentals: An important footing for unificationcooperation

III. Obstacles Ahead

1. Obstacles Ahead in North Korea

- Paramount state request for security and system stability
- Priority for direct state-to-state negotiations with the US (over North-South dialogue)
- Mistrust and resentment towards South Korea
- Awareness of the German model of reunification
- Fear of “cultural infiltration”: Lacking readiness to open up to people-to-people contacts and hence to economic cooperation with the South

2. Obstacles Ahead in South Korea

- Lingering mistrust and resentment towards North Korea
- Lacking readiness to submit grand offer to the North Korean leadership
- Overcoming prejudices and condescending attitudes towards the North Korean people
- Legal Impediments (National Security Act)
- Commercial risks (for investment and sourcing in North Korea)

3. International Reservations

- North Korea's possession of nuclear arms and its potential proliferation activities
- US willingness resp. unwillingness to engage in serious security negotiations with the DPRK
- Supreme security interests of the PRC
- PRC-DPRK alliance legacy

IV. German Inspirations

1. Preliminary Reservation: Unlike the DPRK, the GDR acted in a predictable, calculable way.

- Political restraint and security reassurance from Warsaw Pact membership
- Contractual fidelity

2. Germany's experience offers inspirations rather than lessons

- Deterrence must be always credible.
- Consent the differences of the systems. Do not battle a religious war. Deal with practicable matters.
- Focus on the people, not on the regime: Priority setting for humanitarian matters.
- An unemotional, business-like discussion climate works well. A condemnation or demonisation will not buy concessions.
- The bilateral relationship should be estimated like a treasure, even when international relations become frosty.
- Bipartisan consensus: Political continuity over the change of governments; Honouring agreements of predecessor governments.
- Mutually beneficial agreements: Incentives gain meaningful concessions.
- A thick skin is needed to confront insults, tactical defeats, mad media coverage, underhanded tricks etc.
- Economic policy may be a double-edged sword: Building up influence and prolonging

the life of the regime.

- Facing policy and moral dilemmas: ambivalent business dealings and policy actions at times cannot be avoided.

Session 2

A Unified Korean Peninsula and the Future of East Asia

Towards a Unified Korea: An American Perspective

Peter Beck
The Asia Foundation

I. U.S. Policy Options

1. Ignore the North
2. Containment: Sanctions (BDA) + Interdictions (PSI) = “Strategic Patience”
3. Retaliatory/Preemptive Strike
4. Engagement: Pointless, or the only path forward? – Failed Leap Day Deal (29 Feb. 2012)

→ We need “congagement”!

II. 6-Party Talks: Brain Dead

1. Crisis management mechanism
 - (or exercise in frequent flyer mileage accumulation?)
2. Differing priorities of key players:
 - DPRK: Regime survival
 - US: Denuclearization
 - China: Stability
 - ROK: Denuke, cooperation
 - Japan: Abductions
 - Russia: Cooperation, spoiler

III. Trilateral Coordination is Critical

1. Should TCOG be revived?



IV. Is a Deal Possible?

1. Nuclear Programs: Bargaining chip or life insurance?
2. NK Succession + US distractions – catalyst = slim chance



October 2000



August 2009

V. Key Questions

1. Reunification when?: Later rather than sooner
2. Will unification be gradual or sudden?
3. Implosion or explosion? (OpCon 5029, 5027)
4. Will US forces remain in a reunified Korea?

VI. On Unification

1. Lucky: German-style
Unlucky: Vietnam/Yemen-style
Dream: Hong Kong-style
2. China & Japan: Most opposed
U.S.: Most to gain - U.S. troops will stay indefinitely
3. Low North-South integration despite decade of engagement
4. North-South trade hit \$1B in 2005 vs. China-Taiwan 100x!

VII. The Koreas (2008) and the Germanys (1989)

1. Korean unification will be more expensive than Germany's \$2 trillion

	North Korea	South Korea	N/S	East Germany	West Germany	E/W
Population (mn)	24.0	48.4	49.6%	16.7	61.4	27.2%
Per Capita Income (US\$)	1,064	19,231	5.5%	12,700	38,500	33.0%
Gross National Income (GNI)	24.9	928.7	2.7%	212	2,364	9.0%
Foreign Trade (% of GNI)	15.5	92.3	16.6%	50.0	80.9	61.8%

VIII. Cost of Unification

1. Among dozen studies, cost ranges from \$50 B~\$1.5 T
2. Existing studies are vague/obtuse, overly technical and/or highly unrealistic
3. \$2-3 trillion is more realistic; a messy unification would raise this figure.
4. Paying for unification
 - ROK: Lion's share
 - Japan: ~\$10 B
 - IFIs: Up to \$10 B
 - U.S.: Private sector
 - China: ???

Chinese Perception: A Unified Korean Peninsula and the Future of East Asia

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1. The official stance of China is supporting a “peaceful and independent unification at the Korean Peninsula”. That means first, the unification process should not lead to any kind of disasters; second, the process should not be dominated by any big powers.
2. The main public opinion in China is that the unification is still a future scenario, but it’s understandable that the ROK government needs to prepare something for this future. The discussion with the international community about the peninsula’s unification is also necessary, but it’s better to include DPRK in. If not, the international discussion about the unification should pay enough attention to the concern of DPRK.
3. The political trust between ROK and DPRK is the key to have a “peaceful and independent unification at the Korean Peninsula”, that is why China support the spirit of President Park Geun-hye’s Dresden Declaration. The main stream Chinese media gave quite positive coverage of this initiative.
4. Expectations for the unified peninsula from China: first is a more stable regional situation, a more predictable Korea. Second, more economic cooperation that will benefit the Northeast China in particular.
5. Concerns from China: first is whether the US army will still stay in the peninsula and will deploy in the north of 38th parallel north. Second is the possible territorial dispute between China and the unified Korea.
6. The general mood is that, although the unification is not a near future scenario, finally it will happen. China can benefit from the process and handle the possible differences.

Korean Unification and the Future of East Asia: A Japanese Perspective

Tanaka Hitoshi

Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs/Institute for International Strategy at JRI

- Peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a long-sought goal for not just the Korean people but the East Asian region at large, and an issue which requires deep consideration at the regional level. Strategic thinking is required to sound out how the unification process can best be managed among relevant countries as it unfolds in real time. The ideal form that a unified Korea should take also demands rigorous consideration to ensure future stability and prosperity for both Korea and the region.

I. Unification Scenarios

- The relative ease or difficulty in managing the unification process will depend on the circumstances under which it would take place. In particular, three main scenarios should be considered: an incremental integration, a sudden collapse, and German style absorption. The desirability of these scenarios should be judged in terms of mitigating financial costs, disruptions to the lives of ordinary citizens in both the Koreas, and loss of life, as well as enhancing the stability of the regional landscape of post-unification. Since unification is a highly cherished goal of the Korean people, it is necessary to formulate coordinated measures to reduce the human and financial costs of the unification process.

Incremental Integration

- A gradual transition whereby North and South Korea economically integrate and merge politically on peaceful terms is a scenario which has been desired for some time. Such a scenario assumes at the outset that the two Koreas can peacefully co-exist and that North Korea would gradually implement significant policy changes. This scenario could avoid large economic and military costs and would cause the least amount of disruption to the lives of ordinary citizens through a soft landing process. The elements that would pave the way for this process were set out in the 'Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks' (otherwise known as the 'Statement of Principles') in 2005. In particular, this entails four interrelated key elements: (1) the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea; (2) the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula that converts the current armistice agreement to a peace treaty; (3) international economic and energy cooperation with North Korea; and (4) the normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other. The extended hiatus of the Six-Party Talks

since 2009 and the difficulties in realizing the denuclearization of North Korea, exacerbated by mutual distrust on both sides and disagreements over the sequencing of implementation, have stymied progress on this front.

Sudden Collapse

- A sudden collapse of the North Korean state leaving a power vacuum, a loose nuclear football, and a number of other uncertainties would likely be the most costly scenario. This situation would almost certainly entail a high level of disorder and carries a high risk of considerable bloodshed. North and South Korea would also remain far apart on the question of integration making the rehabilitation of the North's economic and political structures highly expensive. Intensive contingency planning is necessary at the regional level to ensure that all relevant nations are able to react to a collapse scenario in a timely and coordinated manner to mitigate the fallout as much as possible and avoid any unnecessary confusion. The potential for confusion and conflicting interests is highlighted by the uncertainty over how China and the United States may react in light of China's Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty with North Korea and the United States' alliance with South Korea.

German Style Absorption

- A German style unification scenario would see North Korea absorbed by the South. This would require a political movement originating within North Korea driving the regime to voluntarily give up power supported by the international community. This could potentially avoid bloodshed and mass disruption to ordinary citizens' lives, and would serve to maintain South Korea's democratic posture in a unified Korea. But it would still carry high financial costs to integrate the North's underdeveloped economic and political systems into the South's. This scenario also assumes a regime change in North Korea. There are a few complications with this scenario which make it unlikely. First, the possibility of a political movement being instigated from the bottom up by the North Korean people appears remote given the structures of state control over the lives of its people. The Korean People's Army may be better positioned to organize a movement against the regime, but this carries the risk of triggering a civil war within North Korea. Second, the support of Britain, France, and the United States, and the acquiescence of the East German government and the USSR, was generated in no small part due to the context of the Cold War coming to an end and the support structures that West Germany could count on as derived from its membership of NATO and the European Economic Community. The present situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula does not appear to lend itself to a similar pathway.

II. Challenges for South Korea after Unification

- There are three main challenges that South Korea would face in a unified Korea: managing the new national identity, establishing a new security posture, and coordinating new economic opportunities and international assistance to offset unification costs.

Identity of a Unified Korea

- The potential to fashion a new identity under a unified Korea is broad and will be largely determined by the political system and the foreign policy posture it adopts. Ideally a unified Korea would assume a liberal internationalist identity. To this end it is critical to consolidate the democratic tradition that South Korea has established since the late 1980s. Also, a unified Korea will need to find the right balance in order to forge friendly relations with both regional neighbors (including China, Japan and Russia) and the West. The question of whether unification is achieved through absorption or integration also has significant knock-on effects here from a legal standpoint. If South Korea is the legal successor state, then its treaties and agreements with the rest of the world can be maintained. But in the case that South Korea is not designated as the legal successor state, countries including Japan and the United States, which do not have normalized relations with North Korea, will quickly need to establish a basis for normal diplomatic relations with a unified Korea.

A New Security Posture

- Shaping a new security posture for a unified Korea is complicated by a number of factors including nuclear weapons from the North, US troops and bases in the South, and the question of accommodating US-China-Korea relations. On the question of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program, in addition to the immediate need to secure nuclear materials and technologies and prevent them from being proliferated to other states, criminal syndicates, or terrorists, an action plan is needed for the nuclear disarmament of the Korean Peninsula. Failure to denuclearize would undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime and invite the possibility of sanctions at a time when economic resources and international assistance are urgently needed for nation building. The United States alliance with South Korea also poses a tricky dilemma. On the one hand, failing an agreement that US bases can operate in a neutral manner and/or be limited to a geographic scope away from the Chinese border, a US military presence in a unified Korea is likely to generate sharp concern in China. On the other hand, dramatic changes to the alliance will require a unified Korea to take command of its own security, and Japan may have to take on an additional burden for the hosting of US bases in East Asia to cover some of the shortfall. To ensure stable relations among

all countries under the new regional landscape there is a need to carry out confidence building measures. This process could be kicked off by transforming the Six-Party Talks into a Five-Party Talks process to address Northeast Asian security issues.

Offsetting Unification Costs

- Another challenge for South Korea post-unification is to offset unification costs and drive North-South integration. Unification will certainly open up new economic opportunities — such as an expanded common market, new routes for oil and gas pipelines, new airplane routes between China and Japan over the Korean Peninsula, and the responsible utilization of North Korea's natural resources. However, for Korea to bear the costs alone will surely be too big an ask given the relative differences of wealth between North and South, which are significantly higher than the differences between East and West Germany were. To this end, an international steering body should be established to attract and coordinate financial assistance from the international community. Given its history with the Korean Peninsula and its stake in ensuring the stability of its neighboring country and the region more broadly, it will be in Japan's national interest to contribute significantly to the international pooling of financial resources to ensure a smooth unification process.

Korean Unification and Russia's Priorities in East Asia

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I. East Asia at the Crossroads and Prospects for a Unified Korea

- Economic development, security and foreign policy of a Unified Korea on a large scale will be based not only on domestic processes in the North and in the South of the Korean peninsula, but also on the political role of regional powers. In this case, the main political and security trends in East Asia will be important factors influencing economic development and broad scale cooperation of a Unified Korea with other countries, including Russia.
- In the midterm, it seems that the negative trend in the region will be a great challenge for the political and security climate in East Asia. However it doesn't mean that there will not be opportunities for cooperation between regional powers on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly a Unified Korea will have the opportunity to play different kinds of roles in East Asia. At the very least it is possible to take into account two scenarios of development around political, security and economic relations between Russia and a Unified Korea.
- *The First Scenario* of the political and security situation in East Asia means disputes and political confrontation between regional powers (between Russia and the U.S. and American allies, as well as between China and Japan, the U.S. and some other East Asian countries). Political and territorial disputes between China and Japan, political and military competition between China and the U.S., Russia-American antagonism with regard to the Ukraine crisis will become real political problems undermining regional stability and cooperation between regional powers. As a result, political dialogue between regional powers on the Korean peninsula (at the UN and at regional levels) will be limited or even paralyzed. An intensifying arms race, including new assets such as missiles as well as the growing power of regional alliances will become a dominating trend.
- Although the first scenario is more realistic, there is still opportunity for an alternative way of development of international relations in East Asia. *The Second scenario* means more pragmatic trends in political relations between regional powers in East Asia. This is because of economic interdependence and mutual understanding on common regional threats, such as proliferation of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction. Under these conditions regional powers, including Russia will have a chance to realize more flexible policy options towards the Korean peninsula and be-

come more involved in international dialogue on political and security issues. Besides, Russia and the U.S. also have an opportunity to successfully cooperate at the regional level, as they have done so in Afghanistan over the last several years.

- Taking into account these trends it is also possible to forecast two scenarios for foreign policy of a Unified Korea: (1) to be a buffer state as a member of a triangle alliance (together with the United States and Japan) or – (2) a mediator of inter-regional political dialogue as well as economic integration (with participation of all the regional powers). It means that the Korean peninsula will be at the crossroads as a result of unification.
- In the first scenario a Unified Korea would be involved in regional political confrontation and competition between China and Russia on one side, the U.S. and Japan – on the other.
- Under the second scenario, a Unified Korea will have the chance to become an economic hub and an important element of a regional security system. It means that a Unified Korea will balance its foreign policy between its neighbors and the U.S.:
 - ✓ It will take a long period of time to realize full scale unification of all kinds of national systems (economic, political, security, social, etc.) on the Korean peninsula. During this period economic and political support of unification by all regional powers, including China, the U.S., Russia and Japan is crucial for peace, social stability and economic development. Moreover these kinds of support will need to be coordinated by regional powers in order for it to be successful.
 - ✓ Political and economic integration of a Unified Korea and the North will be two processes that will not always be able to coincide with each other. Nevertheless if political and economic integration of a Unified Korea were to oppose each other, due to different priorities of security and foreign economic policy, it will have a negative effect on a Unified Korea and on the security and economic situations in East Asia.

II. Korea's Priorities

- Under these conditions two political initiatives of South Korean president Park Geun-Hye's (*Eurasia* policy and *Trustpolitik* policy) should be taken into account by foreign partners.
- *Eurasia* policy represents the transition of South Korean priorities from an *island type* mentality to a *continental type* set of priorities. In fact the *Eurasia* policy will upgrade

Seoul's cooperation with its Northern neighbors (Moscow and Beijing) on a broader scale related to economic, political and security cooperation. This will make it possible to stimulate the positive support of China and Russia toward Korean Unification. In the future a Unified Korea will have a chance to follow a *continental* policy closely connected with the interests of neighbor countries through cooperation in the development of transport infrastructure, as well as in economic, trade and humanitarian exchanges.

- *Eurasia policy* does not necessarily challenge the Korea-U.S. alliance. To this end, it is necessary to note another initiative by president Park Geun-Hye – *trustpolitik*. *Trustpolitik* not only prioritizes the goal of establishing a better political climate for inter-Korean relations, but balances Eurasia and U.S. interests of Korea's foreign policy as well. Accordingly, *trustpolitik* focuses on compromise and taking into account key priorities of the strategic political and security interests of all regional powers during and after Korean Unification.
 - ✓ It means that Korean Unification will develop successfully if neighboring countries in Northeast Asia agree on basic security, political and economic issues.
 - ✓ The integration of a Unified Korea into East Asia will be realized successfully within the framework of institutions and mechanisms of regular political consultations with participants of all regional powers.
 - ✓ “Six party” or “Five-party” talks on the issues of the Korean Peninsula would be a transit mechanism of multinational consultation on regional and political issues in East Asia as well as Korean Unification.

III. Russia's Regional Priorities in East Asia:

- Moscow intends to intensify political, security, economic and humanitarian exchanges with East Asia. It is not Russia's model of a pivot to East Asia. It is only a new stage of Russia's long-run strategy to rebalance national foreign and economic policy in favor of East Asia.
- Russia does not intend on opposing or minimizing economic exchanges with the European Union.
- Russia-China broad scale cooperation doesn't mean an establishment of a bilateral security alliance against any other countries.

- Strategic regional confrontation is not in Russia's favor. It means that Russia would like to support the establishment of regional dialogue on security issues. Otherwise Russia's economic programs in East Asia will be in danger.
- Moscow intends to upgrade bilateral relations with Beijing. At the same time Russia intends to develop cooperation with other East Asian countries in order to diversify foreign economic relations.

IV. Russia's Strategic Cooperation with Unified Korea

- The Korean peninsula is among the main priorities of Russia's political, security and economic long-run strategy in East Asia:
 - ✓ Security stability and a nuclear weapon free zone on the Korean peninsula are among the goals of Moscow's diplomacy towards the Pacific; that is why a nuclear free Unified Korea will be the best option for Russia.
 - ✓ Under these conditions a Russia-Unified Korea security and political partnership will have the opportunity to be an important element of regional security systems in East Asia.
 - ✓ A Unified Korea will be among Russia's most prominent economic partners, as a Unified Korea gives Russia a chance to diversify regional foreign economic relations, through the realization of infrastructure projects (energy, transport), logistic and communications networks, and joint projects in the modernization of the North.
 - ✓ Close cooperation with a Unified Korea is the comprehensive factor of Russia's domestic program of modernization of Pacific Russia (the Russian Far East and Siberia).
 - ✓ Russia-Unified Korea cooperation will become a channel of Russia's involvement into East Asian economic integration as well as a factor of Russia's position within Pacific integration in general.